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 Sahelian leaders
following a 
 in April. This follows intentions for mutual accountability between the EU and
Sahelian capitals and a “civilian surge” on the part of the EU, as outlined in the new
European 
. Both these concepts are closely connected with “stabilisation” – a word that is
mentioned approximately 20 times in the Strategy. Pinning down not just the meaning of this
word but also how the EU wishes to implement such stabilization strategy is paramount to
ultimately obtaining better living conditions and security for Sahelian citizens.
Read the full text below.
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In less than a year, the Sahel saw four coups d’état, three of which were successful. The �rst
occurred in August 2020: while the European Parliament was passing
 advocating for more extensive military aid provision
to Sahelian states, some elements of the Malian military staged a mutiny and took control of
the government. The coup opened the Pandora’s box of problematic partnerships and forced
European actors to re-examine their relations with Sahelian leaders and reconsider
the 
.  The second (failed) attempt occurred on 30th
March this year in Niamey, the Nigerien capital, where men from special forces intelligence
and security units, the CRS, tried to stage a shortlived coup against newly elected President
Bazoum. Finally, in April President Déby of Chad, who had ruled the country for three
decades, was assassinated, leading to a 
 and
a military takeover by the former president’s son Mahamat Idriss Déby and the Transition
Military Council. Finally, unsatis�ed with the government ministerial choices (especially on
Security and Defence), on May 24th 2021, the Malian military junta staged a 
 (not even a year
since the �rst coup).
Together with widespread violence, perpetrated both by armed groups and security forces,
and continuous protests, these developments are anything but a display of ‘stability’. And
yet, stability is what the new EU Sahel Strategy repeatedly calls for. Clarifying which
interpretation of stabilisation the EU chooses to adopt and, most importantly, how it chooses
to go about implementing its interpretation of the term will be key to European action in the
region (and elsewhere).
The EU Strategy now crystalises the new European long-term vision through, primarily, a
stronger focus on governance. This is in itself not novel thinking on the EU’s part: a 
 called for more structured political thinking concerning governance
last year, and more recently an
 eloquently explained how current
approaches to this apparently elusive term are still all too hollow. To complete the picture,
most recently the EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell admitted that the EU may have
signed too many “
” to Sahelian leaders in the past.
Stabilisation carries weight
 a report by Spanish
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Delving deeper into the Strategy, two new foci emerge: mutual accountability and a “civilian
surge”, both already present in the N’Djamena Communiqué. These elements have already
been dissected 
, as they are both part of a European strategy mainly focused on stabilisation, which
is arguably the overall objective of EU action in the region. But stabilisation is a rather charged
term, with a long history and very different interpretations according to which country or
institution adopts it. The concept itself is birthed in the military realm following con�icts in
the Balkans in the 1990s and subsequent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As for its
civilian interpretation, after the Kosovo intervention, the EU and Germany launched
the 
, in order to better integrate the Balkans
into the European community.
Competing political visions
In the Sahel Strategy, the European approach to stabilisation is often viewed as deriving from
two different and to some extent competing political visions – those of France and Germany.
Germany prioritizes a civilian-oriented approach to stabilisation, as stressed by its 
.
Berlin links the political process to broader stabilisation efforts and considers this to be an
endeavor that includes the Ministry of Defence, but is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Following the demise of the Islamic State in Iraq, stabilisation for Berlin has come to have a
speci�c meaning, distinct from development and security and focused mainly on political
dialogue with regional partners. In addition, German stabilisation projects in areas such as the
Lake Chad basin bear neither the German �ag nor the �ag of implementing partners such as
UNDP, in order to avoid detracting from the sense of ownership by local governments. This is
particularly signi�cant, as ownership is known to be a 
 in the long term, despite also being
problematic in cases in which local elites have no interest in building long-term stability
(which is the case in the Sahel).





, appears to tackle the issue from
here (https://peacelab.blog/2021/04/unpacking-the-eus-new-sahel-
strategy)
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/stability-pact_en)
2017
guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Con�ict, Building Peace
(https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/krisenpraevention/-/231878)
good predictor of peace
(https://www.routledge.com/Peacebuilding-and-Local-Ownership-Post-Con�ict-
Consensus-Building/Donais/p/book/9780415741132)
Comprehensive approach to the Fragilization of States and Societies
(https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf
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a more security-centered angle. The infamous decision to 
 of former Chadian President Déby in the Ennedi bombardments
against northern rebels back in 2019 symbolises Paris’sstabilisation approach: achieving
stability entails fostering strong leadership and a strong military presence. This does not
mean that Paris ignores civilian components to stabilisation, or preventive measures and
political solutions. The difference between Paris and Berlin approaches lies rather in
prioritization: France appears to consider civilian stabilisation components as part of a
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the Sahel, whereas for Germany it is COIN that is part
of a wider civilian stabilisation approach.
For both institutional and historical reasons, the German approach will most likely be the one
that prevails in Brussels, yet this will depend on a number of factors. First and foremost, it will
depend on how successful the new EU Strategy will be in the short term, which will be the
main strategy of the next EU Special Representative for the region. Last but not least, the
approach will depend on whether France and Barkhane expand their reach and push the EU
towards a stronger security presence to compensate for potential de�ciencies caused by the
coup in Chad.
Implementation checkpoints
While the mantra of 
 has seeped into EU policy rhetoric on the Sahel,
the challenge remains in translating this priority into the �eld of implementation. Following
talk on mutual accountability, ownership and higher expectations on Sahelian leaders, Borrell
recently announced that 
, given that Bamako had not reached the necessary objectives agreed
with the EU back in 2020 (for example on 
) Diversion of funds
naturally does not mean that they will be cut, but rather devoted instead to elections in Mali
and other ad-hoc projects. While this signals a new implementation approach on the part of
the EU, problems will persist.
First of all, ex-post/negative conditionality measures, while possibly bene�cial in the longer
term for 
, may truly pose a challenge to successful implementation.
Negative conditionality imposed retroactively is often perceived by the partner country as a
punishment measure and 
 (and potentially draw partners such as




stabilisation through good governance (https://www.tandfonline.com
/doi/abs/10.1080/17449057.2019.1640509)
some EU funds to Mali will be diverted (https://www.r�.fr
/fr/afrique/20210511-l-union-europ%C3%A9enne-renonce-%C3%A0-verser-une-partie-
de-son-aide-au-mali)




may strain relations (https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-
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Secondly, this may lead to foot-dragging, where Sahelian leaders may make commitments
without any real intention of meeting them. By the time the EU identi�es these failed
commitments, funds and political resources may well be exhausted. As effectively put 
, “the contradiction with
ownership is that owners are both the source of the problem and indispensable to the
solution”.
Thirdly, as for more practical implementation, the EU Sahel Strategy recognizes the value of
restoring not just state authority (which carries controversial signi�cance), but also basic
services to all citizens. In some areas however these services have never even arrived.
Focusing more on this aspect, not just as a rhetorical point, but as a true commitment on the
part of the EU, is vital to turning the provision of basic services into a reality. This will not go
unnoticed: the way the EU and its member states choose to disburse their funds, and to which
institutions will de�ne whether the words contained in this Strategy are truly sincere or
whether these are merely empty words. The problem is not one of lack of funds, as
persuasively oulined 
, but how these funds are used and how learning
from previous mistakes is ultimately incorporated back into programming (or not).
On a �nal note: the migration issue remains largely underdeveloped in the Strategy, and the
references that are included are deeply problematic. The Strategy only mentions that it
wishes to “promote fruitful cooperation […], building on the constructive partnerships
established in recent years” with Sahelian countries, leaving many unresolved problems, as
effectively presented  .
Conclusion
The EU will need to clearly de�ne what it means by stabilisation in the Sahel, as this will
constitute the building block for all future endeavours in con�ict areas. Roger MacGinty in
his   of why
stabilisation is not a neutral term states that the “terminological imprecision
surrounding stabilisation creates a meta-category; full of buzzwords but empty of meaning”.
Knowing whether Brussels sees stabilisation through German or French eyes is fundamental
to laying the basis for future implementation, which will need to take into account
relationship challenges with Sahelian leaders deriving from conditionality measures, political
and practical problems with restoring basic services and the wider preoccupations caused by
transitions (and coups) in Mali and, most importantly, Chad.
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